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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the dynamic behavior of the two-sector endogenous growth
model. We demonstrate that indeterminacy–continua of rational expectations equilibria
consistent with self-fulfilling prophecies–emerges when we introduce sector-specific exter-
nal eﬀects and distortionary taxation in tandem.
In his 1988 paper, Lucas [20] argued that one-sector growth models fail to account for
the wide variation in observed cross-country growth rates because they do not endogenize
the accumulation of labor augmenting technology. Building on earlier work by Uzawa
[33], Lucas studied the steady-state growth properties of a model that included an extra
sector producing human capital. Lucas proposed that beyond the direct role of human
capital in the production of final goods, higher levels of education, or increased investment
in research and development, generate indirect improvements in the overall eﬃciency of
production–external economies not captured at the level of the individual worker or firm.
Subsequent work by Benhabib and Perli [4] and Xie [36] demonstrated that the presence of
these economy-wide human capital externalities is suﬃcient to generate indeterminacy in
the Lucas model, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is very high. In Sections 2–4
we present an endogenous growth model with factor taxation and government expenditure.
We limit the scope of external eﬀects to be sector-specific; only the portion of human capital
employed in a sector generates spillover eﬀects in that sector.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [32] find that equilibria are indeterminate in the one sector
real business cycle model if the tax rate on labor is suﬃciently high, and if government
expenditure is not too pro-cyclical. Guo and Lansing [16] demonstrate that in a one sector
model with increasing returns, the dynamic system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation if capital
accumulation is subsidized. In Section 5 we demonstrate that in the two-sector endogenous
growth model with sector-specific external eﬀects, Hopf bifurcations and indeterminacy
emerge with positive rates of capital taxation, and plausible intertemporal elasticities of
substitution, if production is convex in eﬀective labor.
In each of the last two sections, we explore a generalization of the model. In both
sections, we find that empirically plausible tax policies can induce indeterminacy when
production is non-convex in eﬀective labor, or even when increasing returns are completely
absent. In Section 6 we follow Benhabib and Perli [4], Ladron-de-Guevara et al. [19],
and Mino [23], [25], and introduce a labor-leisure choice–when labor supply is elastic,
indeterminacy is consistent with downward sloping labor demand. If the tax on capital
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income is low, two balanced growth paths emerge–one determinate, with a high rate of
steady state growth, and the other indeterminate with low growth.
In the final section, we introduce physical capital as an input in the human capital
sector. Bond et al. [5] demonstrate that high capital taxation is suﬃcient for equilibria to
be indeterminate in a generalized two-sector model, and Mino [24] finds that sector specific
external eﬀects will induce similar results. Combining the two, we find that for a wide range
of fiscal policies, indeterminacy emerges when social returns in both sectors are constant,
and only a small degree of external eﬀects are present in the human capital producing
sector.
2 The Basic Model
Romer [30] was the first to consider the implications of including external eﬀects in an
endogenous growth model. Lucas [20] followed by introducing external eﬀects into the
two-sector model developed by Uzawa [33] in the early 1960’s. Although neither increasing
returns or external eﬀects are necessary for the existence of endogenous growth, the inclu-
sion of human capital externalities enables Lucas’ model to accommodate two important
observations: there are large diﬀerences in the rental rates for human capital (the wage
for a given level of skill) across countries, and also diﬀerences between the growth rates of
physical and human capital within countries.
In contrast to Romer, Lucas eliminated scale eﬀects from his model by restricting the ex-
ternal eﬀects to the average, rather than the aggregate amount of human capital. Nonethe-
less, when adapting the external eﬀects from Romer’s one sector model to a model with two
sectors, Lucas maintained the assumption that the economy’s entire stock of human capital
directly increases productivity in the final goods sector. Therefore in Lucas’ model there
are two distinct types of external eﬀects–positive spillovers across firms within the final
goods sector, and also positive spillovers from the human capital employed in the human
capital sector, that accrue to firms in the production sector. In this paper, we restrict
external eﬀects to be sector-specific–we eliminate the spillovers between sectors.
There are several reasons to prefer this more modest specification of human capital
externalities. First, the inclusion of spillovers between sectors is not necessary to generate
either diﬀerential rates of steady state growth for the two types capital, or higher rental rates
for human capital in rich countries–as we demonstrate below, the inclusion of sector specific
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externalities is suﬃcient. Second, the most obvious spillovers result from complementarities
between the skills of workers–personnel in a sector interact and learn from each other.
Finally, although increases in the total stock of knowledge certainly enhance productivity–
this stock is produced in both domestic and foreign human capital sectors. By restricting
spillovers to the portion of human capital employed in each sector, we focus our attention
on the endogenous, domestically produced portion of human capital.
A number of empirical studies find evidence of sector specific external eﬀects and in-
creasing returns to scale. Paul and Siegel [26] find that sizeable increasing returns are
prevalent in U.S. manufacturing, and that at least two-thirds of the increasing returns can
be ascribed to agglomeration eﬀects–sector specific externalities at the two-digit industry
level. Harrison [18] finds evidence of increasing returns but rejects spillovers between sec-
tors, and Benhabib and Jovanovic [3], demonstrate that the source of aggregate increasing
returns to scale are not the external eﬀects from physical capital inputs. Taken together
the evidence suggests that increasing returns exist–generated by sector-specific external
eﬀects from inputs other than physical capital.
The economy is composed of a government sector and a large number of households–
their behavior is represented by the intertemporal maximization of an infinite-lived rep-
resentative consumer. The consumer chooses the dynamic paths of c, consumption, and
u ∈ (0, 1), the fraction of time or human capital devoted to work in the final goods sector:
max
c
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
c1−σ
1− σdt, (P.1)
subject to the constraints:
·
k = (1− τ l)wuh+ (1− τk) rk − c
·
h = ν (1− u)1−γ h1−γ (1− ua)γ hγa,
where k is the individual’s stock of physical capital, h his stock of human capital, r and w
the rental rates of physical and human capital, τ l and τk, the tax rates on labor and capital
income, σ > 0, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ρ, a positive
discount rate. Time not devoted to work for wages is spent accumulating human capital–ν
is the maximum rate at which human capital can be accumulated. The terms ua and ha are
respectively, the average fraction of hours devoted to work in the final goods sector, and the
per-capita stock of human capital. The parameter γ regulates the size of the external eﬀect
in the human capital sector, and the degree of that sector’s internal decreasing returns.
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Physical goods are produced by a combination of physical capital and eﬀective labor:
y = (uaha)β F (k, uh) . (1)
The term (uaha)β captures the eﬃciency enhancing external eﬀects of that portion of the
human capital stock employed in the final goods sector, just as the term (1− ua)γ hγa is the
analogous external eﬀect for the sector producing human capital.2 We assume F : R2 → R
is homogenous of degree one, so the degree of increasing returns to scale at the social level
is governed by the magnitude of β ≥ 0. Internal factor returns will be:
r = (uaha)β Fk (k, uh) , (2)
w = (uaha)β Fφ (k, uh) . (3)
We define φ = uh, as eﬀective labor and assume the Cobb-Douglas form F (k, φ) =
kαφ1−α for the production function. The parameter space is Θ: θ ≡ (α, β, γ, ν, ρ, σ) , and
θ ∈ Θ, where Θ = (0, 1)×R2+ ×R3++. If λ and μ are the costate variables for physical and
human capital the first order necessary conditions for an interior solution are:
e−ρt
cσ
= λ (4)
(1− α) (1− τ l)λh (uaha)β kα (uh)−α = (1− γ) νμ (1− u)−γ h1−γ (1− ua)γ hγa (5)
αλ (1− τk) (uaha)β kα−1 (uh)1−α = −
·
λ (6)
μν (1− γ) (1− u)1−γ h−γ (1− ua)γ hγa + λ (1− α) (1− τ l) (uaha)β kα (uh)−α u = −
·
μ, (7)
plus the two transversality conditions: limt→∞ λk = 0, and limt→∞ μh = 0.
We assume that the government sector’s budget is always balanced:
gkαφ1−α+β = τ lwφ+ τkrk. (8)
where g is the fraction of output consumed by the government.3 The dynamic behavior
of the economy is described by the laws of motion for per-capita consumption, physical
capital, and eﬀective labor:
·
c =
1
σ
³
α (1− τk) kα−1φ1−α+β − ρ
´
c (9)
.
k = (1− g) kαφ1−α+β − c. (10)
φ˙ =
α
α− β
µ
(1− γ) ν
α
− c
k
+ (τk − g) kα−1φ1−α+β
¶
φ. (11)
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3 The Reduced Model and Balanced Growth
Ordinarily, the dynamic behavior of the Lucas model is described by the laws of motion
of four variables: hours worked in the final goods sector, consumption, and the stocks
of human and physical capital. If external eﬀects are sector-specific, hours worked and
human capital can be combined into one variable, eﬀective labor, and two laws of motion
in stationary consumption and physical capital describe the evolution of the economy.
·ecec = 1σ ³(1− τk)αekα−1 − ρ´− ϑ
µ
(1− γ) ν
α
− ecek + (τk − g)ekα−1
¶
(12)
·ekek = (1− g)ekα−1 − ecek − ϑ
µ
(1− γ) ν
α
− ecek + (τk − g)ekα−1
¶
, (13)
where ec = cφ−1−α+β1−α , ek = kφ− 1−α+β1−α , and ϑ = 1−α+βα−β α1−α .
The term τ l is absent from both laws of motion–without the zero deficit assumption
(8), temporary fluctuations in the tax on wages do not aﬀect the economy. This tax is
equivalent to a lump-sum tax, net of transfer payments.4 The tax rate on capital income
and government spending do appear in the laws of motion–they do aﬀect the behavior
of the economy, including the value of u along the transition path. However, neither the
share of government expenditure in output, nor any tax rate, aﬀects the allocation of time
between the two sectors once the economy has converged to the balanced growth path:
u∗ =
ρ− (η − γ) ν
(1− η) ν , (14)
where η = (1−σ)(1−α+β)(1−α) is the product of the curvature of the utility function, and the ratio
between the social marginal product of human capital, and its internal marginal product.
For an interior solution to P.1 to exist, agents cannot be so impatient they allocate
all available time to immediate production, or so patient they postpone all labor market
activity to maximize the accumulation of human capital. Bounds on the discount rate
ensure that the steady state fraction of hours devoted to work in the final goods sector falls
within the unit interval:
Θ1 ≡ {θ ∈ Θ| (η − γ) ν < ρ < (1− γ) ν and η < 1} (15)
Θ2 ≡ {θ ∈ Θ| (1− γ) ν < ρ < (η − γ) ν and η > 1} ,
where Θ1 ∪Θ2 ⊆ Θ. If θ ∈ Θ1 ∪Θ2, then u∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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Setting (12) and (13) equal to zero, we solve for steady state consumption and capital:
ec∗ = (α− β)
α
µ
Σ1 −Σ2
τk − g
1− τk
¶ek∗ (16)
ek∗ = µ α (1− η) (1− α) (1− τk)
(1− γ) (1− α+ β) νσ − βρ
¶ 1
1−α
, (17)
where Σ1 = ν
³
ρ−(1−γ)
(1−η) +
1−γ
α−β
´
and Σ2 =
βρ−(1−α+β)(1−γ)νσ
(1−α)(α−β)(1−η) .
Proposition 1 There exists a unique interior balanced growth path if and only if θ ∈
Θ1 ∪Θ2 and Σ1Σ2 <
τk−g
1−τk .
Proof. If θ ∈ Θ1 [θ ∈ Θ2] then η < 1 [η > 1], the numerator of (17) is positive [neg-
ative], σ (1− α+ β) > β, [σ (1− α+ β) < β] and (1− γ) ν > ρ [(1− γ) ν < ρ]. There-
fore (1− γ) (1− α+ β) νσ − βρ > 0 [(1− γ) (1− α+ β) νσ − βρ < 0], the denominator
of (17) is positive [negative] as well and ek∗ is positive and unique. If θ ∈ Θ1 ∪ Θ2 and
α > β [α < β] then Σ2 < 0 [Σ2 > 0]. Therefore if θ ∈ Θ1 ∪ Θ2 and Σ1Σ2 <
τk−g
1−τk then
(α− β)Σ1 > (α− β)Σ2 τk−g1−τk and ec∗ in (16) is positive and unique. ¥
If θ ∈ Θ1 ∪Θ2 and τk = τ l = g, a unique interior balanced growth path exists if α < β,
or if α > β and γ < 1− α+ β. We also define the set Θ3 ⊆ Θ:
Θ3 ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|ρ = (1− γ) ν and η = 1} . (18)
If θ ∈ Θ3 the numerators and denominators in (16) and (17) are equal to zero, implying
the existence of an infinite number of balanced growth paths.
Along the balanced growth path, physical output, consumption, wages, and physical
capital, grow at the rate:
κ =
(1− α+ β) ((1− γ) ν − ρ)
(1− α) (1− η) . (19)
The steady state growth rate of human capital is (1−γ)ν−ρ1−η –the presence of sector-specific
externalities is suﬃcient to ensure that physical capital accumulates faster than human
capital. Along the balanced growth path, the rental rate of human capital grows at the
rate β((1−γ)ν−ρ)(1−α)(1−η) . If β > 0, the wage for a given skill-level is directly related to the per-capita
stock of human capital. Although we eliminated inter-sector spillovers, wages for a given
level of skill, just as in Lucas [20], are highest in the most developed countries.
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4 Optimal Taxation
Generally, in an economy without external eﬀects, the optimal long-run tax on capital is
zero. The entire burden for the finance of a fixed amount of government expenditure falls on
labor–the factor which is inelastically supplied. However, if the government is consuming
a fixed, positive portion of output, the optimal long-run tax on capital is positive.
Proposition 2 If external eﬀects are sector-specific, and the production function is concave
in both inputs at the social level, the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy equalizes taxes between
capital and labor income.
Proof. Consider the maximization problem of a social planner who chooses the tax on
capital to maximize utility, subject to the equilibrium conditions (9), (10) and (11). The
current value Hamiltonian will be:
H (c, φ, k, τk, ω, ζ, ψ) =
c1−σ
1− σ + ω
1
σ
h
(1− τk)αkα−1φ1−α+β − ρ
i
c (H.1)
+ζ
£
(1− g) kαφ1−α+β − c
¤
+ ψ αα−β
h
(1−γ)ν
α −
c
k + (τk − g) kα−1φ
1−α+β
i
φ,
where ω, ζ, and ψ are the costate variables that correspond to each of the incentive com-
patibility constraints. Diﬀerentiating H.1 with respect to φ and τk:
∂H
∂φ
= (1− α+ β)
³
(1− τk)
αc
σk
ω + (1− g) ζ
´
kαφ−α+β (20)
+
∙
α
α− β
µ
(1− γ) ν
α
− c
k
¶
+ (τk − g)
µ
α
α− β + ϑ (1− α)
¶
kα−1φ1−α+β
¸
ψ = ρψ − ψ˙
∂H
∂τk
= −ω 1
σ
c+ ψ
1
α− βφ = 0. (21)
We diﬀerentiate (21) with respect to time, and combine with (20), to replace ψ and ψ˙:
ω
µ
(1− τk) +
1
φ
(τk − g)
¶
cekα−1 + ζ σ
α
(1− g)ekαφ 1−α+β1−α = ρωc− ω˙c− ωc˙
ϑ (1− α) . (22)
Inserting (9) into (22), rewriting in terms of stationary variables, and replacing the terms for
stationary consumption and capital with their balanced growth values yields the condition:
σ (1− α)ϑ
αec∗ ζω
µ
1
σ
³
(1− τk)αek∗α−1 − ρ´+ ec∗ek∗
¶
+
ω˙
ω
(23)
+ (1− τk)
µ
(1− α)ϑ+ 1
σ
α
¶ek∗α−1 −µ1 + 1
σ
¶
ρ = (1− α)ϑ
ek∗α−1
φ
(g − τk) .
Along the balanced growth path, the costate variables ζ and ω must grow at the same
constant rate. Therefore ζω and
ω˙
ω are constant, and the first two terms on the left-hand
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side of (23) are constant as well. The other terms on the left-hand side are defined in terms
of stationary variables and must be constant. The right hand side is divided by the term φ
which is non-stationary–the equality is only maintained for every period if τk = g.
Suﬃcient conditions for a maximum can be derived by employing the Arrow Theorem.
Define the maximized Hamiltonian H0 (c, φ, k, ω, ζ, ψ) = max
τk
H (c, φ, k, τk, ω, ζ, ψ) :
H0 (c, φ, k, ω, ζ, ψ) =
c1−σ
1− σ + ω
1
σ
h
(1− g)αkα−1φ1−α+β − ρ
i
c (H.2)
+ζ
h
(1− g) kαφ1−α+β − c
i
+ ψ
α
α− β
∙
(1− γ) ν
α
− c
k
¸
φ.
We write ∂
2H0
∂φ∂φ in terms of the stationary co-state variables ω˜ = ωφ
− 1−α+β
1−α , eζ = ζφ−1−α+β1−α :
∂2H0
∂φ∂φ
= (1− α+ β) (β − α) (1− g)
hα
σ
ω˜ec+ eζeki ekα−1φ4+ 2β1−α , (24)
which is negative if and only if α > β (if the production function is concave so is H.1).5
Finally, from the government’s budget constraint (8), the tax on wages τ l, is also g. ¥
In this economy, government expenditure is analogous to a tax on output, and the
second best optimum is achieved by equalizing all the diﬀerent taxes rates. In fact, as we
demonstrate below, when this policy is adopted the dynamic behavior of the model mimics
the behavior of a model with no government consumption.
Chamley [8] found that in Lucas’ model the optimal tax rate on capital income increases
with the magnitude of the external eﬀects in the total stock of human capital. Proposition
2 demonstrates that the size of sector-specific externalities do not change optimal policy.
Only spillover eﬀects between sectors justify tax rates on capital income higher than g–
and it is only the ineﬃciencies associated with that subset of the total external eﬀects in
Chamley [8], or Lucas [20], that a higher tax on capital income can ameliorate.
5 Taxes and Stability of the Balanced Growth Path
To find the local stability properties of the reduced system in the neighborhood of the
unique balanced growth path, we linearize the laws of motion (12) and (13) around the
steady state. The Jacobian JB, of the linearized system, can be expressed as the sum of
two matrices–JA, the Jacobian of a model without a government sector, and a second
matrix, M, multiplied by τk−g1−τk which represents the eﬀects of fiscal policy:
JB = JA+
τk − g
1− τk
M, (25)
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where:
JA =
⎡
⎣
1−α+β
1−α Σ1 −
1−α+β
1−α Σ1 +
βρ−(1−α+β)(1−γ)νσ
(1−η)σ
β
α(1−α)Σ1 −
β
1−αΣ1 −
(1−γ)(1−α+β)ν
α−β
⎤
⎦ (26)
M =
1
(1− α)
⎡
⎣ − (1− α+ β) α (1− α+ β)
−βα β
⎤
⎦Σ2. (27)
If g = τk, then JB = JA–if taxes on capital and labor are equal, the local dynamic
properties of the system will be identical to one without a government sector.
If the eigenvalues of the Jacobian have opposite signs, competitive equilibria are locally
determinate. If both eigenvalues are negative, all paths converge to the balanced growth
path and equilibria are indeterminate. The trace of JB is:
TrJB = TrJA +
τk − g
1− τk
TrM, (28)
where TrJA = ρ−(1−γ)ην1−η and TrM = −Σ2. The determinant of JB is:¯¯
JB
¯¯
=
(βρ− (1− α+ β) (1− γ) νσ)2
ασ (α− β) (1− α) (1− η)
∙
Σ1
Σ2
− τk − g
1− τk
¸
. (29)
Proposition 3 All equilibria in the neighborhood of the balanced growth path are unique
if and only if θ ∈ Θ1 [θ ∈ Θ2], and the share of physical capital is higher [lower] than the
magnitude of the externality α > β [α < β].
Proof. From Proposition 1 the term in square brackets in (29) must be negative. If θ ∈ Θ1
[θ ∈ Θ2] ⇒ η < 1 [η > 1] and therefore if α > β [α < β] the determinant (29) is negative.
This is suﬃcient to ensure that the two eigenvalues of JB have opposite signs. ¥
Proposition 4 If θ ∈ Θ1 [θ ∈ Θ2] and the share of physical capital is lower [higher] than
the magnitude of the externality α < β [α > β], there will exist a continuum of equilibria
in the neighborhood of the balanced growth path if and only if the ratio of government
expenditure to capital taxation is suﬃciently low [high] that TrJ
A
Σ2 <
τk−g
1−τk [
τk−g
1−τk <
TrJA
Σ2 ].
Proof. If θ ∈ Θ1 [θ ∈ Θ2] then (29) is positive if and only if α < β [α > β]. If θ ∈ Θ1
[θ ∈ Θ2] then η < 1 [η > 1], ρ > (1− γ) ν [ρ < (1− γ) ν] and ρ > (1− γ) ην [ρ < (1− γ) ην].
Therefore TrJA > 0. If θ ∈ Θ1 ∪ Θ2 and α < β [α > β], then Σ2 > 0 [Σ2 < 0], TrM < 0
[TrM > 0], and (28) is negative if and only if TrJ
A
Σ2 <
τk−g
1−τk [
τk−g
1−τk <
TrJA
Σ2 ]. If
¯¯
JB
¯¯
> 0, and
TrJB < 0, both eigenvalues of JB are negative. ¥
For all the cases not covered by Propositions 3 and 4, the determinant and trace of the
Jacobian of JB will both be positive, the eigenvalues are both positive, and the steady state
is a source. The dynamics of the system are summarized in Table 1.
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τk−g
1−τk ≤
Σ1
Σ2
Σ1
Σ2 <
τk−g
1−τk <
TrJA
Σ2
τk−g
1−τk =
TrJA
Σ2
TrJA
Σ2 <
τk−g
1−τk
α > β
θ ∈ Θ1
θ ∈ Θ2
No Interior BGP
No Interior BGP
Saddle Path
Indeterminate
Saddle Path
Hopf
Saddle Path
Unstable
α < β
θ ∈ Θ1
θ ∈ Θ2
No Interior BGP
No Interior BGP
Unstable
Saddle Path
Hopf
Saddle Path
Indeterminate
Saddle Path
Table 1: The dynamic structure of the model with government expenditure and distor-
tionary taxation.
Table 1 demonstrates the two possible conditions for the emergence of indeterminacy.
As in Benhabib and Perli [4], a low degree of increasing returns in conjunction with a high
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (θ ∈ Θ2) will imply indeterminacy–provided the
tax on labor is high, relative to the tax on capital. For lower intertemporal elasticities of
substitution (θ ∈ Θ1), indeterminate equilibria emerge if the production function is convex
in eﬀective labor and the tax on capital income is high.6
To demonstrate the dynamic structure of the model, we concentrate on the more plau-
sible of the two parameter spaces, Θ1, and assume that σ=1.5, α=.285, g=.21, ρ=.05, and
ν = .065. If β=0 and γ=0, both per-capita human and physical capital are growing at a
rate of 1% per annum and the rate of return on physical capital is 6.5%. The horizontal
line α = β divides the plane in Figure 1 between sets of {β, τk} that make detJB nega-
tive (below) and those that make detJB positive (above), (where lim
β→α−
detJB = −∞ and
lim
β→α+
detJB = +∞). Below this line, equilibria are unique and above the line, shifts in the
tax burden from labor to capital move the system between successive areas of positive real
eigenvalues, complex eigenvalues with positive real parts, complex eigenvalues with negative
real parts and negative real eigenvalues. Between the two regions with complex eigenvalues
there is a Hopf bifurcation–along the curve defined by τHopfk =
TrJA+gΣ2
TrJA+Σ2
, for β > α, the
eigenvalues are purely imaginary. An increase in the size of the external eﬀect in the human
capital sector γ, makes the curve representing the Hopf bifurcation in Figure 1, pivot to
the right–reducing the range of fiscal policies consistent with indeterminacy. Lowering the
value of σ, causes the curve to pivot to the left and for suﬃciently low values, it bends
backwards–as in Benhabib and Perli [4], and Xie [36], higher intertemporal elasticities of
11
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Figure 1: The dynamics of the model for various values of β and τk, assuming σ=1.5, α=.285,
g = .21, ρ =.05, and ν =.065. The Hopf bifurcation is drawn for two values, γ = 0, and γ = .2. In
the unshaded area, both eigenvalues are positive, and in the shaded both eigenvalues are negative. In
the area with vertical stripes the eigenvalues have opposite signs. Above the curve that corresponds
to the discriminant ∆ =
h
Tr
³
JA+ τk−g1−τkM
´i2
− 4
¯¯¯
JA+τk−g1−τkM
¯¯¯
, equal to zero, the eigenvalues
are complex. Note that the iso-growth curves are horizontal–changes in the tax rate do not aﬀect
the long-run growth rate κ.
substitution raise the likelihood of indeterminacy.
To the right of the Hopf bifurcation in Figure 1, all balanced growth paths are stable
focii–any point in their neighborhood satisfies the equilibrium conditions. As the tax
burden shifts from capital to labor, the oscillations dampen more slowly, until finally the
tax on capital falls below τHopfk , and balanced growth paths are locally unstable focii. Are
there competitive equilibria in the neighborhood of an unstable focus? Yes, if the increase
in the amplitude of the oscillations around it taper oﬀ–the system approaches a limit
cycle, and the Hopf bifurcation is supercritical. If there are no limit cycles, the bifurcation
is subcritical and the dynamic paths violate the non-negativity conditions. Our numerical
simulations suggest that these Hopf bifurcations are subcritical.
With all physical capital confined to the final goods sector, indeterminacy only emerges
if there are increasing returns and distortionary, non-Ramsey optimal taxation.
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Proposition 5 Indeterminacy is not possible without both increasing returns and distor-
tionary, non-optimal taxation,
Proof. If β = 0 then η = 1− σ and θ ∈ Θ1. From Proposition 3, if α > β and θ ∈ Θ1 all
competitive equilibria are unique. If τk = g, JB = JA and TrJA > 0. ¥
The inter-sector spillovers in Lucas’ version of the model play a critical role in generating
the indeterminacy found by Benhabib and Perli [4]. To see why, consider what happens
in Lucas’ model if some people decide that in the next period, returns to physical capital
will rise. Savings increase and the stock of capital accumulates at a faster rate. Because
of the complementarity between capital and eﬀective labor, wages rise–people respond by
shifting from human capital production, to the production of physical goods. The increase
in eﬀective labor in the final goods sector raises the return on capital. Thus, if the initial
belief–that the rate of return on physical capital will be higher–is shared by enough
people, the decision to increase investment is justified, and the prediction self-fulfilling.
This process is not explosive because the decline in the stock of human capital causes total
factor productivity to decline.
This explains a seeming paradox–balanced growth paths in the Lucas model with its
expansive type of external eﬀects may be indeterminate (if the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is very high) or saddle-path stable, while more modest external eﬀects
imply explosive dynamics. By adding taxes to dampen physical capital accumulation,
we exploited this loss of stability to generate indeterminate equilibria with empirically
plausible intertemporal elasticities of substitution; though increasing returns suﬃcient to
imply positively-sloped aggregate labor demand curves are required. Such high degrees
of increasing returns are consistent with the results in Hall [17], Caballero and Lyons
[7], Farmer and Guo [13], and Paul and Siegel [26]. However calculations by Basu and
Fernald [1], Burnside [6], and Harrison [18] find small increasing returns, or none at all.
In the remaining sections of this paper, we consider two generalizations of the model, that
significantly lower, or eliminate, the degree of increasing returns necessary to generate
indeterminacy.
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6 Elastic Labor Supply
We introduce elastic labor supply by adding to the utility function a term for all time
devoted to non-leisure activities L:
max
c,L
Z ∞
0
µ
e−ρt
c1−σ
1− σ −
L1−ε
1− ε
¶
dt, (P.2)
subject to
·
k = (1− τ l)wuh+ (1− τk) rk − c
·
h = ν (L− u)1−γ h1−γ (La − ua)γ hγa.
The term La represents the economy-wide average amount of time devoted to either labor
market activity or human capital accumulation.
To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path, we must set σ=1–the static elasticity
of labor supply is zero and the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply is −1ε . When labor
supply is elastic, three stationary laws of motion are necessary to describe the dynamic
behavior of the economy:
u˙
u
=
α
α− β
µ
(τk − g)ekα−1 − ecek
¶
+ ν
1− γ − α+ β
α− β L+ νu (30)
·ecec = 1σ ³(1− τk)αekα−1 − ρ´− ϑ
µ
(1− γ) ν
α
L− ecek + (τk − g)ekα−1
¶
(31)
·ekek = (1− g)ekα−1 − ecek − ϑ
µ
(1− γ) ν
α
L− ecek + (τk − g)ekα−1
¶
, (32)
where:
L =
"
uecek−α
1− α− g + ατk
# 1
ε
, (33)
and 0 < u < L.
We express steady state consumption, capital and hours worked, in terms of the steady
state rate of growth κ:
ec∗ = (1− g) ρ+ κ (1− g − α (1− τk))
(1− τk)
ek∗, (34)
ek∗ = µα (1− τk)
ρ+ κ
¶ 1
1−α
, (35)
u∗ =
(1− g − α (1− τk)) (κ+ ρ)
(1− g) (κ+ ρ)− (1− τk)ακ
µ
(1− α) (κ+ ρ) + βρ
ν (1− γ) (1− α+ β)
¶ε
. (36)
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Setting (30) equal to zero, and inserting, (34), (35), and (36) yields:µ
((1− g) (κ+ ρ)− (1− τk)ακ) ((1− α) (ρ+ γκ) + βρ)
ν (1− γ) (1− α+ β) (1− g − α (1− τk)) (κ+ ρ)
¶ 1
ε
− (1− α) (κ+ ρ) + βρ
ν (1− γ) (1− α+ β) = 0,
(37)
which reduces to (19), when η = 0 and ε→∞.
Proposition 6 A balanced growth path that corresponds to an interior solution to the
agents maximization problem exists for any real κ > 0 such that the condition (37) is
satisfied.
Proof. The assumption that τ l < 1 implies that 1−g > α−ατk, therefore ec∗ in (34) and u∗
in (36) are positive. Using (33), (34), (35), and (36) the amount of time in steady state de-
voted to human capital accumulation is L∗−u∗ = (1−α)κ(1−α+β)ν > 0. ¥
Ladron-de-Guevara et al. [19], demonstrate that in an undistorted endogenous growth
model with a utility function that is additively non-separable in consumption and leisure,
there can be two determinate, balanced growth paths. The non-linearity of (37) implies
a similar result–particularly when  approaches zero from below. If α = .285, ρ = .05,
ν = .065 but g = τk = γ = β = 0 and  is no higher than -.1925, (an intertemporal elasticity
of labor supply of at least 5.2), the model has two determinate balanced growth rates. The
absence of decreasing private returns in the production of human capital is responsible for
the non-concavity of the optimization problem P.2 and the subsequent non-uniqueness.
Higher tax rates on capital and bigger external eﬀects in the final goods sector, lowers the
labor supply elasticity necessary to generate multiple solutions to equation (37). Likewise,
for a given combination of external eﬀects, higher elasticities of labor supply increase the
range of capital taxes consistent with multiple solutions to (37). Finally, when externalities
in the human capital sector are high, multiple solutions to (37) emerge when rates of capital
taxation are higher.
To determine the dynamic behavior of the model we linearize the system (30), (31), and
(32), at values of κ that solve (37). The Jacobian of the linearized system JC , is a three
dimensional, square matrix (it can be expressed as the weighted sum of three matrices:
JC = A+τk−g1−τkB+
1
C). Define R
¡
JC
¢
= jC12j
C
21 + j
C
13j
C
31 + j
C
23j
C
32 − jC11jC22 − jC11jC33 − jC22jC33
–the signs of Tr
¡
JC
¢
, R
¡
JC
¢
,
¯¯
JC
¯¯
, and the term
¯¯
JC
¯¯
−Tr
¡
JC
¢
R
¡
JC
¢
, provide all the
information necessary to describe the dynamic behavior of the linearized system.
In Figure 2 we illustrate the dynamic behavior of the model–we once more set σ=1.5,
α=.285, g=.21, ρ =.05 and ν =.065, assume that =-.25, and to ensure that P.2 is concave,
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Figure 2: The dynamics of the model with elastic labor supply for various values of β and τk,
assuming -1ε=4, α=.285, g=.21, ρ=.05, and ν=.065. In the grey areas, equilibria are indeterminate–
the lower left-hand grey triangle is a region with low growth and indeterminate equilibria. For
a given tax rate the discriminant ∆ = 1108(4R
¡
JC
¢3
+ 4Tr
¡
JC
¢3 ¯¯
JC
¯¯
−Tr
¡
JC
¢2R ¡JC¢2 −
18Tr
¡
JC
¢2R ¡JC¢ ¯¯JC ¯¯ + 27 ¯¯JC ¯¯2), is equal to zero for two diﬀerent values of β on the upper
(higher growth) portion of the manifold (42)–above this curve eigenvalues are complex. The iso-
growth curves are now diagonal–higher taxes on capital imply a higher long-run growth rate.
set γ to be a small but positive number, .001.
With the addition of elastic labor supply, the iso-growth curves in Figure 2 are no
longer horizontal–fiscal policy aﬀects long-run rates of growth. In the region where the
curves overlap, there are multiple solutions to (37). On the lower portion of the manifold
defined by (37), higher tax rates on capital correspond to lower iso-growth curves within
this region. On the upper portion of the manifold, higher capital tax rates correspond to
higher iso-growth curves. If the relative tax burden on capital is especially low, there is
no interior solution to the agent’s optimization problem–all time will be allocated to the
production of physical goods. When capital income is heavily taxed, balanced growth paths
are unique, the steady state growth rate is increasing in τk, and the dynamics of the model
are identical for both endogenous and exogenous labor supply. If the production function is
concave in eﬀective labor,
¯¯
JC
¯¯
is negative and equilibria are unique, and if the production
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function is convex in eﬀective labor,
¯¯
JC
¯¯
is positive and equilibria will be indeterminate.
A Hopf bifurcation exists on the upper part of the manifold with low capital taxation–in
this region
¯¯
JC
¯¯
> 0, Tr
¡
JC
¢
> 0, and R
¡
JC
¢
> 0, there is one real positive eigenvalue,
and where
¯¯
JC
¯¯
−Tr
¡
JC
¢
R
¡
JC
¢
= 0, the two complex eigenvalues are purely imaginary.
A Hopf bifurcation also exists on the lower part of the manifold defined by (37). To its
left, the lower grey triangular in Figure 2, is a poverty trap–a region of low growth, and
indeterminacy. If labor supply is elastic, agents can substitute between three instead of
just two activities–indeterminacy is possible even with downward sloping labor demand.¯¯
JC
¯¯
= −(1− α) (κ+ ρ)
2 ((1− α)κ+ (1− α+ β) ρ)
α (α− β) (1− α+ β) (1− γ) (38)
×{((1− α)κ+ ρ) ((1− α) γκ+ (1− α+ β) ρ)
(κ+ ρ) ((1− α)κ+ (1− α+ β) ρ) +
µ
τk − g
1− τk
¶
(1− α) γκ+ (1− α+ β) ρ
(1− α)κ+ (1− α+ β) ρ
+
µ
−1

¶µ
τk − g
1− τk
¶
γ +
µ
−1

¶
(1− α)2 (κ+ 2ρ) γκ+ ((1− α) (γ − α)− αβ) ρ2
(1− α) (κ+ ρ)2
}.
What are some observable conditions associated with poverty traps? A necessary (but
not suﬃcient) condition for indeterminacy, is that
¯¯
JC
¯¯
> 0 (from the Routh-Hurwitz The-
orm). Since the first of the four terms inside the brackets of (38) is positive, indeterminacy
is only consistent with α > β if the sum of the remaining three terms is negative and large
enough (in absolute value) to ensure that the entire term in brackets is negative as well.
The last term inside the brackets is negative if β >
(1−α)((1−α)(κ+2ρ)γκ−(α−γ)ρ2)
αρ2 . Thus, for
a given rate of growth, this last term is a product of the elasticity of labor supply
¡
−1
¢
and a term directly related to the elasticity of labor demand. The poverty trap in Figure 2
emerges in an economy where both labor supply and demand are highly elastic and income
from capital is not too heavily taxed.
If labor supply is elastic, fiscal policy determines the steady state growth rate. Further-
more, a shift in the tax burden from labor to capital can move the economy out of a poverty
trap, to a region where balance growth paths on the lower portion of the manifold defined
by (37) are unstable. The economy jumps to the higher, determinate balanced growth path.
Further shifts in the tax burden move the economy to the region where balanced growth
paths and equilibria are unique and growth is even higher.
7 Physical Capital in the Human Capital Sector
So far we have assumed that human capital is produced with only human capital. Although
there are external eﬀects in both sectors, indeterminacy emerges when distortionary tax-
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ation is combined with externalities and increasing returns, on the production side of the
economy. Social returns in the human capital sector are constant, and external eﬀects there,
play only a minor role in determining the dynamic behavior of the model.
If physical capital is employed in the production of human capital, agents respond to
anticipated changes to rates of return by reallocating not only human capital, but also
physical capital between the two sectors. In this section we demonstrate that when the tax
burden on capital is suﬃciently high, indeterminacy emerges when social returns to scale
are constant, and only a small degree of external eﬀects are present in the human capital
producing sector.
The maximization problem of the representative agent will be:
max
c
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
c1−σ
1− σdt, (P.3)
subject to
·
k = (1− τ l)wuh+ (1− τk) rsk − c
·
h = ν (1− s)δ kδ (1− u)1−δ−γ h1−δ−γ (1− ua)γ hγa,
where s is the fraction of capital employed in the final goods sector, and δ regulates the
share of physical capital in the production of human capital. We assume constant social
and private returns in the final goods sector:
k˙ = (1− g) (sk)α (uh)1−α − c. (39)
We define two factor intensities–x˜y = skuh is the portion of physical capital employed in
the final goods sector, divided by the portion of human capital employed in that sector, and
x˜h =
(1−s)k
(1−u)h is the analogous ratio for the human capital sector. The dynamic behavior of
the economy is described by the laws of motion for detrended consumption c˜ = ch , physical
capital k˜ = kh , and the ratio between the costates for human and physical capital p =
μ
λ :
·ecec = 1σ ((1− τk) r − ρ)− ν (1− u) x˜δh (40)
·ekek = (1− g) x˜αyu− c˜k˜ − ν (1− u) x˜δh (41)
p˙
p
= −1− g − α (1− τk)
1− α
w
p
+ (1− τk) r. (42)
Equilibrium factor returns, hours worked in the production sector, and factor shares are:
r = αx˜α−1y (43)
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w = (1− α) x˜αy , (44)
u =
k˜ − x˜h
x˜y − x˜h
. (45)
x˜y =
"µ
1− γ − δ
1− g − α (1− τk)
¶1−δ
pν
µ
δ
α (1− τk)
¶α# 1α−δ
(46)
x˜h =
"µ
δ
α (1− τk)
¶αµ 1− γ − δ
1− g − α (1− τk)
¶1−α 1
pν
# 1
α−δ
. (47)
Both external eﬀects and taxes aﬀect the relative factor intensities of the sectors:
x˜y
x˜h
=
(1− γ − δ)α (1− τk)
δ (1− g − α (1− τk))
. (48)
Proposition 7 The final goods sector is relatively intensive in physical capital (x˜y > x˜h), if
and only if τk−g1−τk <
α(1−γ)−δ
δ and the human capital sector is relatively intensive in physical
capital (x˜y < x˜h), if and only if
τk−g
1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ .
Proof. Follows directly from (48). ¥
In Bond et al. [5] and Mino [24], indeterminacy emerges when the final goods sector is
relatively intensive in physical capital at the social level, but intensive in human capital at
the private level. The same is true in this model–the former condition is satisfied if α > δ,
and the latter if δ1−δ−γ is larger than
α
1−α
1−τk
1−τ l . Inserting τ l =
g−ατk
1−α , the condition at the
private level is τk−g1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ –once more dynamic behavior is determined by the value
of the familiar ratio τk−g1−τk .
Proposition 8 If α > δ, all equilibria in the neighborhood of the balanced growth path
are unique if and only if capital taxation relative to government expenditure is suﬃciently
low that τk−g1−τk <
α(1−γ)−δ
δ . If
τk−g
1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ there exists a continuum of equilibria in
the neighborhood of the balanced growth path. If α < δ all equilibria in the neighborhood
of the balanced growth path are unique if and only if τk−g1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ and unstable if
τk−g
1−τk <
α(1−γ)−δ
δ .
Proof. We linearize (40), (41), and (42) and denote the Jacobian as JD. Since jD31=j
D
32 =
0, one eigenvalue of JD is jD33=−
(1−α+δ)
(α−δ)
∙
[νδδ(1−γ−δ)(1−δ)]
2−α
(((1−α)(1−τ l))(1−δ)(α(1−τk))δ)
(1−α)
¸ 1
1−α+δ
, which is
negative if α > δ, and positive if α < δ. The signs of the remaining two eigenvalues are
determined by the signs of the determinant and trace of the submatrix
⎛
⎝ j
D
11 j
D
12
jD21 j
D
22
⎞
⎠. Since
jD11 = 0, the trace of the submatrix is j
D
22=
c˜∗(x˜∗y−x˜∗h)+(1−g)x˜∗hx˜∗αy +νx˜∗δh k˜∗2
k˜∗2(x˜∗y−x˜∗h)
. From Proposition
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Figure 3: The dynamics of the model with physical capital employed in the human capital sector,
for various values of γ and τk, α=.285, δ = .2, g = .21, ρ =.05, and ν =.12. In the area with
vertical stripes there are two positive and one negative eigenvalue. In the shaded area are there are
two negative and one positive eigenvalue.
7, x˜y > x˜h if and only if
1−g
1−τk < (1− γ)
α
δ . Therefore if
1−g
1−τk < (1− γ)
α
δ , j
D
22 is positive.
From (45), if x˜y < x˜h then k˜ < x˜y and if
τk−g
1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ , j
D
22 =
(1−g)x˜∗αy +νx˜∗δh (2k˜∗−x˜∗y)
k˜∗(x˜∗y−x˜∗h)
is negative. The determinant of the submatrix is −jD21jD12 = − 1k˜∗
νx˜∗δh
x˜∗y−x˜∗h
, which is positive
if τk−g1−τk <
α(1−γ)−δ
δ , and negative if
τk−g
1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ –the submatrix has eigenvalues with
opposite signs if τk−g1−τk >
α(1−γ)−δ
δ and two positive eigenvalues if
τk−g
1−τk <
α(1−γ)−δ
δ . ¥
Captions for Figures:
The combinations of capital taxes and external eﬀects that support indeterminacy are
presented in Figure 3 along with the iso-growth curves that correspond to solutions for (49)
with δ = .2. The additional curves show the borders between determinacy and indetermi-
nacy for alternative values of δ. Indeterminate equilibria emerge for lower combinations
of capital taxes, and external eﬀects, as the value of δ rises. Proposition 8 combines the
results in Bond et al. [5] with Mino [24]. The horizontal axis in Figure 3 corresponds to
the results in the former, and the vertical axis corresponds to the results in a simplified
version of the latter.7
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If physical capital is an input in the production of human capital, fiscal policy aﬀects
the rate of steady state growth:
κ =
1
σ
h
ν (1− γ − δ)1−δ δδ (1− g − α (1− τk))δ
i 1−α
1−α+δ
(α (1− τk))
αδ
1−α+δ − ρ
σ
. (49)
Nonetheless, the relative flatness of the iso-growth curves in Figure 3 confirms the obser-
vation by Stokey and Rebelo [31], that in the absence of elastic labor supply, the ability of
fiscal policy to aﬀect growth is very modest. However, if the share of physical capital in
the human capital sector is suﬃciently large, fiscal policy can determine the stability of the
economy–high taxes on capital income will coincide with multiple equilibria, particularly
if there are some diminishing private returns in the human capital sector, or the share of
physical capital in that sector is significant.
8 Conclusion
In his 1988 paper, Lucas emphasized the important steady state growth properties of the
two-sector model but conceded: “The dynamics of this system are not as well understood as
those of the one-good model,...” Benhabib and Perli [4], Bond et al. [5], Xie [36], Ladron de
Guevara et al. [19], and the results in this paper, demonstrate that neither the uniqueness
of equilibria, or even the uniqueness of balanced growth paths is robust to a variety of
modest extensions that feature prominently in one-sector models with exogenous growth.
Grandmont et al. [14], and Pintus et al. [28] have analyzed the global dynamic proper-
ties of discrete-time one-sector models, particularly in the regions surrounding Hopf bifur-
cations. Guo and Lansing [16] and Coury and Wen [11] demonstrate that even in the region
where steady states have a saddle structure, global indeterminacy may exist. By contrast,
whereas the local dynamic properties of endogenous growth models with human capital
accumulation are now better understood, the global dynamics of these models remain terra
incognita. This is only one of several aspects of this model that need further investigation.
Because of their saddle structure, standard real business cycle models generate monotonic
impulse responses. By contrast, models with indeterminacy have complex eigenvalues, and
generate impulse responses from simple shocks that replicate many of the cyclical patterns
observed in U.S. data. Indeed, from work by Benhabib and Farmer [2], Farmer and Guo
[12], [13], Perli [27], Weder [34], and Wen [35], we learn that exogenous growth models with
indeterminacy generate artificial time series that mimic the dynamic behavior of the U.S.
economy.
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Traditional real business cycle models have weak endogenous propagation mechanisms–
they have trouble replicating observed autocorrelations, or impulse responses not incorpo-
rated within the dynamics of the impulses themselves (see Cogley and Nason [9]). These
models also fail to mimic the shape of the spectrum of output–they neither capture its
low frequency properties or generate a peak in its spectrum at business cycle frequencies.
Collard [10] shows that a one-sector endogenous growth model generates a non-zero-valued
spectrum for output at the zero frequency and output series with positive serial correla-
tion. Unlike models with exogenous growth, Collard’s model produces the hump-shaped
pattern of impulse responses to transitory shocks also generated by VAR estimates of the
U.S. economy.
Could a model that combines endogenous growth with indeterminacy produce even
better responses to shocks? And what kind of shocks? McGrattan [21] demonstrates that if
the standard RBC model is altered to include distortionary taxation, fiscal policy shocks can
explain more than half the fluctuations in output. Perhaps better results can be achieved
by a model that combines fiscal policy with endogenous growth, and indeterminacy.
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Notes
2 In Lucas’ version of the model ua = 1 and γ = 0.
3 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [32] demonstrate that if government expenditure is not too
pro-cyclical, a wide range of plausible fiscal policies are consistent with indeterminacy in a
detrended one sector real business cycle model. In a model with endogenous growth, the
common trend between output and government expenditure cannot be ignored.
4 Integrating the individual’s budget constraint over the time variable q starting at time
t, and using the first order conditions, replacing the term h(q) with h(0)e
U q
0 (ν(1−u(s)))dsand
(1− τ l(q))w(q) with e
U q
t (1−τk(s))rk(s)ds (1− τ l(t))w(t)eν(t−q) :Z ∞
t
e−
U q
t (1−τk(s))rk(s)dsc(q)dq = (1− τ l(t))w(t)h(0)e
U t
0 (ν(1−u(s)))ds
Z ∞
t
e−ν
U q
t u(s)dsu(q)dq| {z }
U| {z }
W
+k(t)
The term W is equal to the present value of human wealth at time t. The value of hours
devoted to physical production that maximizes human wealth from time t forward is the
set of u (s) that maximizes the term U. Neither the value of this term, nor the present value
of consumption, is directly eﬀected by the future time path of τ l.
5 The second derivative with respect to consumption is negative:
∂2H0
∂c∂c
= −σ
hecφ(t) 1−α+β1−α i−σ−1 .
Diﬀerentiating H0 twice with respect to capital and inserting (20):
∂2H0
∂k∂k
=
αek2
Ã
1
σ
ecek
"
(2− α) (1− α) (1− g)
ekα−1
φ(t)
1−α+β
1−α
− 2ec# ω˜ − eζ (1− α) (1− g)ekα! ,
The term in square brackets approaches zero from above as t → +∞. All the other terms
are negative.
6 Mendoza, Razin and Tesar [22] find that in the United States, between 1965 and 1988, the
average tax on capital was .43, labor .25, and consumption .06. Although their calculation of
labor taxation is not net of transfer payments, U.S. fiscal policy, as well as fiscal policy in the
United Kingdom, Japan and Canada fall within the range consistent with indeterminacy.
7 Raurich [29] demonstrates that if factor returns are taxed in both sectors, and lump-sum
taxation is also present, indeterminacy emerges when the tax imposed on both factors in
the final goods sector, finances a flat-rate subsidy to the factors employed in the human
capital sector.
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